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JEFFREY SAGALEWICZ*
The Martha Duty: Protecting
Shareholders from the Criminal
Behavior of Celebrity Corporate
Figures
In late December 2001, Martha Stewart sold her entire holdingof ImClone stock.1  Shortly afterward, government agencies
discovered Stewart’s sale during an investigation into possible in-
sider trading involving sales of ImClone stock.2  News of the in-
vestigation broke six months later.3  As a result, investors
lambasted the share price of Stewart’s company, Martha Stewart
Living Omnimedia Inc. (MSO), causing MSO’s market capitali-
zation to decline by two-thirds.4  The government eventually ob-
tained an indictment against Stewart for conspiracy, false
statements to investigators, obstruction of justice, and securities
fraud.5  In March 2004, Stewart was convicted on all counts but
* Third-year law student, University of Oregon School of Law.  Special thanks to
Professor Judd Sneirson for helpful comments and critical guidance.
1 Indictment, United States v. Stewart, ¶ 17 (June 4, 2003), available at  http://
news.findlaw.com/legalnews/documents (last visited July 1, 2004) [hereinafter Indict-
ment].  Two months earlier, Stewart had divested her pension plan of ImClone
shares.  Will Swarts, Lawyers Spar in Martha Case , THE STREET.COM (Jan. 27, 2004),
at  http://www.thestreet.com/pf/markets/willswarts/10139825.html.
2 Indictment, supra  note 1, ¶ 22.
3 Id.  ¶¶ 58-67.
4 Beam ex rel . Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961,
969 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d , 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).  In the two months between
June 6, 2002, when the Associated Press broke the story that the government was
investigating Martha Stewart’s ImClone sale, and August 9, 2002, MSO shares de-
clined from $19.01 per share to $6.69 per share, a loss of $12.32 per share.  The share
price settled in the $10 range in the month following her March 5, 2004 conviction.
See  Yahoo! Finance, at  http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=MSO for historical prices
of MSO.
5 See generally  Indictment, supra  note 1.
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securities fraud, which the judge dismissed.6
The massive decline in MSO market capitalization after allega-
tions surfaced that founder-chairperson-CEO-corporate name-
sake Martha Stewart privately profited from insider trading
illustrates the investment risk to shareholders of a corporation
whose welfare is inextricably intertwined with the public image
of a “celebrity corporate figure.”7  Whether it is a multi-billion
dollar, publicly traded company or a local general partnership, a
celebrity corporate figure’s private behavior may destroy a busi-
ness’s value for other shareholders or partners alike.8  For exam-
ple, shareholders of MSO lost over six hundred million dollars of
market capitalization and faced uncertainty regarding the future
value of the company as the market reacted to Stewart’s
wrongdoing.9
Shareholders should not have to assume the risk that the pri-
vate criminal behavior of celebrity corporate figures may damage
shareholder value.  Using Martha Stewart’s civil and criminal
lawsuits as a backdrop,10 this Comment explores whether share-
holders who suffer a loss in shareholder value due to a celebrity
corporate figure’s private behavior can recover the loss under
state law fiduciary duties or federal securities law, and, if not,
whether shareholders should be able to recover for such injuries
under a proposed new fiduciary duty for celebrity corporate
figures.  This Comment does not assert that all corporate figures
6 Jonathan D. Glater, Stewart’s Lawyers Gambled with a Minimal Presentation ,
N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2004, at C1.
7 This Comment uses the term “celebrity corporate figure” to refer to individuals
associated with a business in such a manner that the individuals and the business are
thought of interchangeably. See  discussion infra  Part I.
8 Although this Comment focuses on corporation law, the discussions of tradi-
tional fiduciary duties, infra  Part III.A, and the proposed new “Martha Duty,” infra
Part V, sufficiently apply to other business entities such as partnerships, limited lia-
bility corporations and closed corporations.
9 MSO’s share price declined by $12.32 per share in the two months following the
Associated Press story of the Stewart investigation. See supra  note 4.  The $12.32
per share loss multiplied by the approximately 49.62 million shares outstanding re-
sults in an approximate decline of six hundred million dollars.  As owner of over
sixty percent of the outstanding shares, Stewart was not immune from the losses her
behavior caused. See Indictment, supra  note 1, ¶ 59. See also  Trends, Risks, and
Uncertainties, Form 10-Q Quarterly Report for Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia,
Inc. (Nov. 14, 2003), at  http://biz.yahoo.com/e/031114/mso10-q.html.
10 Beam ex rel . Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961
(Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d,  845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004); In re  Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc. Sec. Litig., 02-CV-6273 (JES) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb 3, 2002); United
States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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should be liable for all private behavior that harms shareholder
value.  Instead, it focuses on the behavior of celebrity corporate
figures and a narrow range of private behavior.
The first part of this Comment defines the celebrity corporate
figures from whom shareholders should be able to recover when
the celebrity’s private behavior harms shareholder value.  The
second part narrows the range of private behavior that should
expose celebrity corporate figures to liability.  Having identified
the particular celebrity corporate figures at issue and the range of
behavior that should generate liability, the third part analyzes the
usefulness of state law fiduciary duties to trigger the celebrity
corporate figure’s liability to the shareholders.  The fourth part
analyzes the usefulness of federal securities law to remedy losses
caused by the private behavior of these celebrity corporate
figures.  Concluding that existing state and federal law remedies
do not sufficiently protect shareholders, the final part proposes a
new fiduciary duty to be placed on celebrity corporate figures
that would allow shareholders to recover when the celebrities’
private behavior harms shareholder value.
I
IDENTIFYING WHICH CELEBRITY CORPORATE
FIGURES SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR PRIVATE BEHAVIOR THAT
CAUSES A DECLINE IN SHAREHOLDER VALUE
The private behavior of corporate figures can harm the busi-
nesses with which they are associated.  After Kobe Bryant was
charged with sexual assault, the companies that he endorsed suf-
fered losses by abandoning their investment in Bryant as an en-
dorser,11 losing the goodwill associated with his ad campaigns,12
or delaying Bryant-specific merchandise.13  Martha Stewart con-
spired to conceal the events that led to her private stock trade,
obstructed justice, and made false statements to investigators,
costing MSO shareholders hundreds of millions of dollars in mar-
ket capitalization.14  John DeLorean’s arrest for attempting to fi-
11 See Chocolate Maker Phasing Kobe Out , NEWSDAY, Aug. 5, 2003, at A51;
Corky Siemaszko, Kobe Ad Career is Dribbling Off, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 20,
2004, at 4.
12 See  Tamara E. Holmes, Celebrities and Scandal  (Aug. 1, 2003), at  http://www.
blackenterprise.com/ExclusivesekOpen.asp?id=436.
13 See  Natalie Zmuda, Retail Debut of Kobe Shoe in Question , FOOTWEAR NEWS,
Oct. 20, 2003, at 2.
14 See supra  note 9.
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nance a drug deal was the death knell of the beleaguered
DeLorean Motor Company.15
One could imagine similar situations in which a business would
be harmed by the private behavior of a corporate figure.  Yet, the
average corporate figure likely does not put her business at risk
through her private behavior.  Perhaps the public sufficiently
separates the average corporate figure from the company such
that no confusion exists between the corporate figure’s private
behavior and the well-being of the business.  More likely, the av-
erage corporate figure is anonymous to the public, and thus no
risk accedes to the business from her private behavior.  This
Comment looks beyond the average corporate figure to a cate-
gory of celebrity corporate figures to determine which corporate
figures should be liable when their private behavior leads to a
decline in shareholder value.
In defining the celebrity corporate figures who should be liable
if declines in shareholder value are caused by their private be-
havior, this Comment departs from the narrow, conventional use
of the term “celebrity” to describe famous entertainers and ath-
letes.  Such celebrities do play a role in the public image of busi-
nesses, typically as endorsers and sometimes as owners or
management;16 however, such a narrow definition would leave
out the individuals that put shareholders most at risk.  Instead,
celebrity corporate figure encompasses individual business own-
ers or management whose public image is so inextricably inter-
twined with the businesses that the public makes little or no
distinction between the individual and the business.  Examples
include Martha Stewart’s relationship to MSO and Warren Buf-
fet’s relationship to Berkshire Hathaway Inc.  National notoriety,
though, is no prerequisite.  Exclusively local businesses may also
include celebrity corporate figures, if the local public image is
such that the business is inextricably linked with owners or
management.
As an initial matter, celebrities like Kobe Bryant, who serve
solely as endorsers or spokespersons, should be excluded from
the definition of celebrity corporate figures.  Although there is
15 See  Judith Cummings, Ex-Auto Maker to Go on Trial After Long Wait , N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1984, at A12.
16 One example is Earvin “Magic” Johnson, who started Johnson Development
Corp. after retiring from professional basketball. See  http://www. johnsondevelop-
mentcorp.com.
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an undeniable public association of spokespersons to the busi-
ness for which they endorse, holding spokespersons accountable
to shareholders for the impact their private behavior has on
shareholder value is inappropriate.  Mainly, the connection be-
tween the spokesperson and the business does not typically rise
to the level of being inextricable.  In fact, celebrity endorsers and
spokespersons are in demand precisely because of the careers
they developed separate from the business.  Often, these celebri-
ties leverage their fame to endorse multiple businesses at the
same time.17  Thus, the public can more readily separate these
celebrities from the particular business for which they advertise.
Furthermore, spokespersons are typically only tangentially re-
lated to the business.  They are essentially employees of the mar-
keting arm, not central decision-makers or strategists.  Finally,
employment contracts can effectively limit shareholders’ expo-
sure when a spokesperson’s bad public behavior starts to affect
shareholder value.18
Conversely, individuals like Martha Stewart, who convert their
personal reputation or expertise into business success, are often
inextricably intertwined with the businesses they have created,19
and therefore they must be included in the definition of celebrity
corporate figures.  Their private behavior is not as easily severa-
ble from the business as an endorser’s or spokesperson’s, prima-
rily because the individual tends to be the product itself,
manifested in magazines, towels, and color palettes.  That indi-
vidual’s connection to the business, not the business’s assets and
infrastructure absent the individual, tends to dominate share-
holder value.20  Employment contracts are likely insufficient to
17 For example, Kobe Bryant endorsed McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, and Nike.  Chris
Isidore, Advertisers Worry: Who’s Next? , CNN/Money, at  http://money.cnn.com/
2003/07/21/news/companies/kobe_impact (July 22, 2003).
18 Spokesperson contracts can include a morality clause that allows the business to
terminate spokespersons if they do anything to damage their reputation.  E. Susan
Vogt, What to Consider When Signing Up a Celeb , STRATEGY MAGAZINE, at  http://
www.gowlings.com/resources/publications.asp?Pubid=781 (Feb. 11, 2002).
19 MSO’s initial prospectus stated that “Martha Stewart, as well as her name . . .
are integral to our marketing efforts and form the core of our brand name.  Our
continued success and the value of our brand name therefore depends, to a large
degree, on the reputation of Martha Stewart.” Prospectus, Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc. 12, at http://www.hoovers.com/mso/—ID_53053,ipage_870379—/
free-co-secoutline.xhtml (Oct. 19, 1999).
20 Morningstar analyst T.K. MacKay estimated MSO at $7 per share without
Stewart, at a time when the stock was trading at $12 per share, down from the IPO
price of $40 per share and pre-indictment price of over $19 per share.  Dan Cook,
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protect shareholders from the private behavior of these celebrity
corporate figures because they typically are not only the com-
modity but also the dominant shareholder, and thus they are in a
position to ransom a favorable contract in exchange for participa-
tion in the business venture.21  For example, although Stewart’s
employment contract contained a morality clause, the clause was
a part of the definition of “cause” for termination, not a ground
on which the company could sue for breach of contract.22  Also,
absent converting the business into a new, celebrity-free entity,
terminating the employment contract does little to limit the asso-
ciation between the celebrity and the business.  To illustrate,
Martha Stewart stepped down as chairwoman and CEO of MSO
in June of 2003, but the market performance of the company was
still tied to the outcome of Stewart’s criminal trial.23  This type of
celebrity corporate figure should be held accountable for certain
private behavior that harms shareholder value because of her in-
extricable connection to the business.
Also included in the definition of celebrity corporate figures
who should be liable for private behavior that harms shareholder
value are superstar CEOs and corporate namesakes.  Unlike in-
dividuals who transform personal reputation into business suc-
cess, both superstar CEOs and corporate namesakes derive their
celebrity status from business acumen.  Therefore, the connec-
tion between their private behavior and the company is not as
intense.  Still, these celebrity corporate figures can transcend the
business in such a way that the welfare of the corporation is inex-
tricably intertwined with the superstar CEO or corporate name-
sake’s personal public image,24  particularly when the celebrity is
Life Without Martha , CNN/Money, at  http://money.cnn.com/2004/01/06/news/ com-
panies/martha_impact/index.htm (Jan. 24, 2004).
21 Stewart controlled over 94% of the voting power. See  Beam ex rel.  Martha
Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 978 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d ,
845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
22 See generally  Form of Employment Agreement, at  http://contracts.corporate.
findlaw.com/agreements/martha/marthastewartemplyagt.html (last visited July 7,
2004).
23 See  Trends, Risks, and Uncertainties, Form 10-Q Quarterly Report for Martha
Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. (Nov. 14, 2003), at  http://biz.yahoo.com/e/ 031114/
mso10-q.html.  Furthermore, the huge decline in share price upon her conviction in
the criminal case shows that the market continued to factor Stewart’s presence into
the worth of MSO. See  David B. Wilkerson, Stewart Shares Close With 23% Loss;
Media Stocks Mixed , at  CBS.MarketWatch.com (March 5, 2004).
24 A Wharton Business School study correlated a 10% change in CEO reputation
with a 24% change in market capitalization.  Leslie Gaines-Ross, CEO Reputation:
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the namesake of the corporation.  Employment contracts can
more effectively limit the corporation’s exposure to risk with
these celebrity corporate figures than with dominant personali-
ties such as Martha Stewart, but a similar power imbalance po-
tentially exists that may dampen the contract’s overall effect.
Instead of foreclosing accountability to the shareholders for the
private acts of superstar CEOs and corporate namesakes, corpo-
rate law should protect shareholders when the market deter-
mines that the superstar CEO or corporate namesake is so
closely linked to the business that their private misbehavior
harms shareholder value.
Essentially, celebrity corporate figures are individuals like
Martha Stewart who transform personal reputations into busi-
ness success, as well as superstar CEOs and corporate name-
sakes.  The next step is to determine the type of private behavior
for which celebrity corporate figures should be liable when the
behavior harms shareholder value.
II
CELEBRITY CORPORATE FIGURES SHOULD BE
LIABLE TO SHAREHOLDERS FOR LOSSES CAUSED BY PRIVATE
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
Obviously, the range of private behavior that may garner nega-
tive public attention is endless; from political affiliation to relig-
ious habits, dietary decisions to extreme sport hobbies, drunken
driving to insider trading.  To hold a celebrity corporate figure
liable for any private behavior that harms shareholder value
would blur all distinction between that individual’s private life
and the corporation.  As the judge in Martha Stewart’s share-
holder derivative suit noted, although important to MSO, Stew-
art was “not the corporation.”25
A rule restricting the entire range of private behavior is unde-
sirable.  Aside from constitutional concerns,26 a rule limiting an
individual’s liberty to choose private activities in which to partici-
The New Factor in Shareholder Value , DIRECTORSHIP, Vol. 26, Iss. 5, at 4 (May
2000).
25 Beam , 833 A.2d at 971.
26 Any rule that restricted the entire range of personal behavior would at least
raise First Amendment freedom of association and Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment equal protection concerns, but because the author narrows the personal behav-
ior at issue to criminal behavior, a discussion of these constitutional concerns is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
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pate is inconsistent with American values.  Such a rule would
also lack predictability because the individual celebrity corporate
figure may not know which private activities risked liability for
shareholder losses until the market negatively responded to the
activity.  For example, the market might penalize the share price
of an investment company whose elderly superstar CEO an-
nounced intentions to climb Mt. Everest, if the market deter-
mined that the danger associated with the CEO’s mountain
climbing was an unnecessary risk of an important company asset.
However, the same announcement by the athletic CEO of an ex-
treme sports outfitting company might not raise any clamor.  Fi-
nally, investors do have responsibility to assess the various risk
factors of an investment, including factoring the dependency of
the corporation on the celebrity corporate figure’s public image.
Alternatively, a rule that imposed liability on a celebrity cor-
porate figure for the harm to shareholder value that derived from
criminal behavior undertaken in the celebrity’s private capacity
would avoid the above concerns.  Officers and directors already
have a fiduciary duty to act legally in their corporate capacity.27
The celebrity corporate figure could still choose any legal private
behavior.  The celebrity corporate figure could predict that legal
behavior will be free from liability, regardless of how damaging
the behavior might be to the company, leaving the onus on share-
holders to value the business in accordance with the likelihood a
celebrity figure would engage in private legal behavior harmful
to the corporation.
Normally in corporate law, it is desirable to place the risk of
loss on shareholders because they have an opportunity to assess
risks and factor them into the valuation of a corporation.  This
approach assumes that the various disclosure and reporting re-
quirements adequately inform investors of the information nec-
essary to assess risk adequately.  Additionally, individual
investors are best suited to shoulder risk because they can reduce
risk by diversifying their holdings.  The business judgment rule
exemplifies this approach by putting the risk of bad business de-
cisions on the shareholders, not the directors making the
decisions.28
The presence of fiduciary duties, however, illustrates a legal
rejection of a total “buyer-beware” approach that places all the
27 See infra  Part III.A.
28 See  discussion infra  Part III.A.
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risk on shareholders in every situation.  Shareholders only as-
sume the risk of bad business decisions and damages from the
breach of a duty of care.29  Shareholders do not assume the risk
that directors lack good faith or act in a self-interested or disloyal
manner.30  Similarly, corporate law should not require sharehold-
ers to assume the risk that celebrity corporate figures will commit
private criminal acts to the detriment of shareholder value.
Additionally, requiring shareholders to assume the risk that
celebrity corporate figures might commit private criminal acts is
bad policy.  First, shareholders likely will not have access to in-
formation demonstrating a celebrity corporate figure’s propen-
sity for criminal activity, which is an important component in
assessing the risk that a corporate figure’s criminal acts would
harm the value of a corporation.  Also, courts typically shift risk
to the party best able to shoulder it only in situations when they
must allocate risk between innocent parties.31  When a celebrity
corporate figure commits private criminal acts to the detriment
of shareholder value, the responsibility should lie squarely on the
celebrity.  No allocation is necessary.  Effectively, burdening
shareholders with this risk can be analogized to the rules requir-
ing boards to monitor employees to prevent them from violating
the law.  Courts have resisted requiring boards to monitor em-
ployees absent some reason for suspicion, stating “neither corpo-
rate boards nor senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing
simply for assuming the integrity of employees and the honesty
of their dealings on the company’s behalf.”32  Similarly, share-
holders should not be charged with liability for assuming the in-
tegrity of celebrity corporate figures absent some reason for
suspicion.
The first two parts of this Comment have identified celebrity
corporate figures as individuals who should be liable to share-
holders when their private criminal behavior harms shareholder
value.  Having identified the individuals and behavior at issue,
the next part discusses the applicability of traditional fiduciary
duties to assess liability to corporate celebrity figures.  This part
29 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004).
30 See id.
31 See , e.g. , DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, §334 (2000) (discussing the ratio-
nale behind the doctrine of vicarious liability, which assigns risk to an innocent em-
ployer on the justification that the employer is in a better position to absorb the loss
and spread the risks than an innocent individual).
32 In re  Caremark, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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will use the example of celebrity corporate figure Martha Stew-
art, whose criminal activity destroyed much of MSO’s share-
holder value.
III
APPLYING STATE LAW FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO
MARTHA STEWART’S IMCLONE STOCK TRADE
Martha Stewart’s ImClone stock trade and the surrounding
events provide an excellent, high-profile example of a celebrity
corporate figure whose private criminal behavior harmed the
shareholder value of her company.  Although Stewart was acting
in a private capacity when she traded her ImClone stock, the
market penalized MSO.33
According to the government’s indictment, on December 27,
2001, Martha Stewart’s stockbroker, Peter Baconovic, learned
that ImClone CEO Sam Waksal and a family member urgently
arranged to sell a large quantity of ImClone stock.34  Baconovic
then ordered his assistant, Douglas Faneuil, to inform Stewart of
Waksal’s sale.35  Stewart, in turn, sold all her ImClone stock.36
Within the following two days, ImClone publicly disclosed that
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rejected ImClone’s bi-
ologics licensing application for Erbitux.37  By selling prior to the
public disclosure of the FDA rejection, Stewart avoided losses of
approximately $50,000.38
The Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and United States Attorney’s Office all investi-
gated whether ImClone trades prior to the public disclosure of
the FDA’s rejection of Erbitux were based on material, nonpub-
lic information.39  According to the indictment, Stewart and
Baconovic conspired to conceal the events leading to Stewart’s
sale of ImClone stock during the course of the investigation.40
Specifically, Stewart was accused of altering her phone log from
the date Baconovic informed her of Waksal’s sale,41 falsely stat-
33 See supra  note 4 and accompanying text.
34 Indictment, supra  note 1, ¶ 13.
35 Id.  ¶¶ 15-16.
36 Id.  ¶ 17.
37 Id.  ¶¶ 19-20.
38 Id.  ¶ 21.
39 Id.  ¶ 22.
40 Id.  ¶ 23.
41 Id.  ¶ 26.
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ing that she had a pre-planned sell strategy that required Baco-
novic to sell her ImClone shares when the price dipped below
sixty dollars,42 denying she knew of Baconovic’s message in her
phone log,43 and denying conversations where nonpublic infor-
mation about ImClone was discussed.44  Furthermore, after the
Associated Press (AP) became the first to publicly report Stew-
art’s ImClone trade on June 6, 2002, the government alleged that
Stewart committed securities fraud when she made false and mis-
leading statements regarding the sale in an effort to shore up the
decline in MSO’s share price that began after the AP’s report.45
All told, Martha Stewart was indicted for conspiring to ob-
struct justice, make false statements, and commit perjury; making
false statements to investigators; obstructing justice; and commit-
ting securities fraud.46  MSO shareholder Monica Beam brought
a derivative action against Stewart and her board, alleging that
Stewart breached her fiduciary duty to the corporation by engag-
ing in insider trading, that the board failed to monitor Stewart’s
private affairs, and two other allegations not related to the Im-
Clone transaction.47  Attorneys also filed a class action complaint
asserting securities fraud.48
A. Fiduciary Duties Generally
Broadly speaking, corporate officers and directors owe fiduci-
ary duties of loyalty, good faith, and care to the corporation.49
42 Id.  ¶ 27a, ¶ 36.  Had Stewart implemented a strategy to sell ImClone prior to
learning insider information, she would have had a defense to claims of insider trad-
ing because there would be no causal connection between her possession of the ma-
terial non-public information and the stock sale. See  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c); SEC
v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1335 (11th Cir. 1998).
43 Indictment, supra  note 1, ¶ 27b.
44 Id.  ¶ 27e, ¶ 36a.
45 Id . ¶¶ 58–67.
46 See generally id .
47 Beam ex rel.  Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961
(Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d , 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).  One of the allegations not related
to the ImClone transaction included a breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty by usurping
a corporate opportunity when Stewart sold shares of MSO to a combination of four
interrelated business entities: ValueAct Partners, ValueAct Partners II, ValueAct In-
ternational, and VA Partners. Id.  at 970 n.9, 972.  The other allegation was a breach
of the fiduciary duty of care regarding MSO paying split-dollar insurance premiums,
which might be a violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Id.  at 975.
48 In re  Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Sec. Litig., 02-CV-6273 (JES)
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb 3, 2002).
49 DENNIS J. BLOCK, ET AL., 1 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DU-
TIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 107 (5th ed. 1998); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8,
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Liability attaches on breach of these duties unless the business
judgment rule protects the director.50  Additional liability may
attach under the doctrine of waste.51  Although claims for a
breach of fiduciary duty and waste belong to the corporation,52
shareholders may bring a derivative suit to assert the corpora-
tion’s claim, but only after making a demand on the board.53
Failure to make a demand or allege facts that would show that
the demand would have been futile results in a dismissal of the
case.54
The duty of loyalty “requires an undivided and unselfish loy-
alty to the corporation [so] that there shall be no conflict be-
tween duty and self-interest.”55  Director actions that implicate
this duty are usually self-interested transactions, including usurp-
ing a corporate opportunity,56 setting director and officer com-
pensation,57  using corporate powers to maintain control,58
selling corporate control,59 and engaging in a competitive
enterprise.60
The duty of care requires that the director or officer make de-
cisions using ordinary good faith, due diligence, and skill and
judgment under the circumstances.61  The duty applies to the di-
rector’s decision-making process, not to the substance of the de-
cision.62  Actions that implicate the duty of care include
§ 102(b)(7) (2004).  Partners have similar duties, although to an even higher stan-
dard. WILLIAM E. KNEPPER AND DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OF-
FICERS AND DIRECTORS §1-11 (6th ed. 1988); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(N.Y. 1928).  Whether good faith is subsumed within the duties of loyalty and care
or a wholly separate duty is a matter of current debate. See  Hillary A. Sale, Dela-
ware’s Good Faith , 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 463 (2004).  This Comment treats good
faith as being subsumed within the duties of loyalty and care.
50 See  discussion infra  Part III.A.
51 See  discussion infra  Part III.A.
52 DENNIS J. BLOCK, ET AL., 2 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DU-
TIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 1379-85 (5th ed. 1998); KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra
note 49, § 3-14.
53 DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
54 Beam ex rel.  Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961,
977, 984 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d , 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
55 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939).
56 See id.
57 See  Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1974).
58 See  Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
59 See  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
60 See Guth , 5 A.2d at 514.
61 BLOCK ET AL., supra  note 49, at 117-26.
62 BLOCK ET AL, supra  note 49, at 126; see also  Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
264 (Del. 2000).
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abdicating corporate governance,63 failing to monitor the busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation,64 and turning a blind eye to-
ward misconduct.65
Proving a duty of care violation is difficult.  Not wanting to
subject directors or officers to liability simply for bad judgment,
courts focus on whether directors used care in the decision-mak-
ing process instead of the substance of the decision.66  If the
plaintiff cannot plead facts that show an absence of care in the
decision-making process, the business judgment rule attaches and
protects directors and officers from liability.67  The business judg-
ment rule “presumes that business decisions are made by disin-
terested and independent directors on an informed basis and
with a good faith belief that the decision will serve the best inter-
ests of the corporation.”68  However, the business judgment rule
will not protect directors who cause the corporation to engage in
illegal acts.69  Even if a plaintiff shows an absence of care, direc-
tors and officers may still avoid liability if they relied on experts
when making their decisions.70  Additionally, corporate charters
can limit director liability for monetary damages resulting from
the breach of the duty of care,71 making the breach enforceable
only by prospective, injunctive relief.
In addition to liability for breaches of fiduciary duties, direc-
tors and officers may be liable to the corporation for the waste or
squandering of corporate assets.72  Although waste may be in-
voked in situations of unreasonable director compensation,73 ex-
cessively low sales prices for corporate assets,74 and corporate
gifts,75 courts rarely second guess directors’ or officers’ substan-
63 See, e.g. , In re  Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998).
64 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra  note 49, §§ 3-9, 3-10.
65 See, e.g. , In re  Caremark, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch.
1996).
66 See  Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264; In re Walt Disney Co ., 731 A.2d at 362.
67 BLOCK ET AL., supra  note 49, at 110.
68 BLOCK ET AL., supra  note 49, at 4-5.
69 See  Lewis v. Aronson, 466 A.2d 375, 384 (Del. Ch. 1983).
70 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2004).
71 Id.  § 102(b)(7) (2004).
72 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations  § 1687.  “A transaction constitutes a ‘waste of
corporate assets’ if it involves an expenditure of corporate funds or a disposition of
corporate assets for which no consideration is received in exchange and for which
there is no rational business purpose.” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1 PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.42 (1994).
73 See, e.g. , Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933).
74 See, e.g. , Telxon Corp. v. Bogomolny, 792 A.2d 964 (Del. Ch. 2001).
75 See, e.g. , Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991).
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tive business decisions, confining waste to only unconscionable
cases.76
B. The Beam Suit
The Beam  plaintiffs alleged that Stewart breached her fiduci-
ary duty to the corporation by engaging in insider trading, that
the board failed to monitor Stewart’s private affairs, and two
other allegations not related to the ImClone transaction.77  How-
ever, the suit settled only the issue of whether the MSO board
owed a fiduciary duty to shareholders to prohibit her from en-
gaging in criminal acts that could harm shareholder value.  The
court dismissed the claim that the board violated its fiduciary du-
ties to monitor Martha Stewart to ensure that her private behav-
ior did not harm the company for failure to state a claim.78  The
court also dismissed without prejudice the claim that Stewart in-
dividually breached her fiduciary duty to the company because
the plaintiff failed to make a demand on the board or adequately
plead why a demand would be futile, as required by Delaware
Court of Chancery Rule 23.1.79  Thus, whether Stewart’s private
actions constituted a breach of her fiduciary duties remains an
open question.
As explained above, the failure to monitor the business and
affairs of the corporation is an example of the breach of the duty
of care.80  Normally, a claim of failure to monitor arises when the
directors have been negligent in monitoring the affairs of the
company, with corporate liability resulting.81  However, “that the
Board has a duty to monitor the [private] affairs of an officer or
director is quite novel.”82  The court required Beam to allege
76 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000).
77 See supra  note 47.  Beam ex rel.  Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v.
Stewart, 833 A.2d 961 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d , 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).  One of the
allegations not related to the ImClone transaction included a breach of fiduciary
duty of loyalty by usurping a corporate opportunity when Stewart sold shares of
MSO to a combination of four interrelated business entities: ValueAct Partners,
ValueAct Partners II, ValueAct International, and VA Partners. Id.  at 970 n.9, 972.
The other allegation was a breach of the fiduciary duty of care regarding MSO pay-
ing split-dollar insurance premiums, which might be a violation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. Id.  at 975.
78 Id.  at 972.
79 Id.  at 976.
80 See  discussion supra  Part III.A.
81 Beam , 833 A.2d at 971; see also In re  Caremark, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996);
In re  Baxter Int’l Inc. Shareholders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268 (Del. Ch. 1995).
82 Beam , 833 A.2d at 971.
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facts that suggested both that the board had a reason to monitor
Stewart and that the board had a duty to monitor her private
affairs.83
“[A]bsent a cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the di-
rectors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to
ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect ex-
ists.”84  Beam failed to allege facts that suggested a cause for sus-
picion prior to the publication of the story detailing the
investigation and her involvement in the ImClone sale.85  How-
ever, even if Beam had shown cause for suspicion, the court was
not willing to place a duty to monitor private affairs upon the
board unless the plaintiff cited a case to support the duty.86  Prior
case law characterized the cause for suspicion in terms of
“wrongdoing by the corporation .”87  Although she was important
to the company, Stewart was not the corporation.88  No duty ex-
isted to monitor Stewart’s private affairs, so the claim was
dismissed.89
Importantly though, the court did not foreclose the claim that
Stewart breached her fiduciary duties individually when she sold
shares of ImClone.90  Instead, the court dismissed the claim be-
cause Beam failed to make a demand on the board or allege facts
that demonstrated that a demand would have been futile.91  The
83 Id . at 971-72.
84 Id.  at 971 (quoting Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del.
1963)).  In In re Caremark , the court surmised that Graham ’s holding, quoted in
Beam , would likely require updating in light of subsequent developments in Dela-
ware corporate law, stating:
[I]t would . . . be a mistake to conclude that our Supreme Court’s statement
in Graham  concerning “espionage” means that corporate boards may sat-
isfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation,
without assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist in
the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior manage-
ment and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow
management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judg-
ments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its busi-
ness performance.
In re  Caremark 698 A.2d at 970.  Even under Caremark ’s updated interpretation, it
is doubtful a court would require “information and reporting systems” to provide
timely feedback about the personal affairs of management or employees.
85 Beam , 833 A.2d at 971.
86 Id.  at 971-72.
87 Id.  at 971.
88 Id.
89 Id.  at 972.
90 Id.  at 977.
91 Id.  at 984.
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court excused the demand requirement against Stewart and the
other inside director, but no facts suggested that the four outside
directors were incapable of considering the demand.92  How the
court may have decided the claim that Stewart individually
breached her fiduciary duties is discussed next.
C. Stewart’s Actions Analyzed Under Traditional
Fiduciary Duties
Beam alleged that “[t]o the detriment of the Company and in
complete disregard [of] her fiduciary duties of loyalty and care,
Stewart [had] jeopardized the future financial health of the Com-
pany by placing her own interests before those of the Company
and its shareholders.”93  Stewart’s actions, however, cannot easily
be characterized as a breach of loyalty or care when analyzed
under the existing legal framework and case law.  Furthermore,
Stewart’s ImClone sale and the ensuing damage to MSO’s corpo-
rate reputation does not fit the definition of waste.
A claim that Stewart breached her duty of loyalty likely would
fail.  Stewart’s ImClone stock sale was self-interested in that she
acted to avoid $50,000 in personal losses.  However, the duty of
loyalty does not apply to every private action simply because it
was undertaken in the director’s best interest.  Instead, the duty
of loyalty implicates self-interested transactions in which the di-
rector’s interest runs contrary to that of the corporation.94  The
stock sale was a private decision solely in Stewart’s interest, with
no connection to MSO.  None of the typical duty of loyalty situa-
tions apply: the Stewart facts do not describe a director compen-
sation issue, the usurping of a corporate opportunity, use of
corporate powers to maintain control, sale of corporate control,
or engaging in competitive enterprise.
One may argue that Stewart breached her duty of loyalty by
proceeding with her self-interested transaction despite the risk
that any illegality in the transaction could tarnish her public rep-
utation and damage the value of the company.  When framed in
this manner, Stewart’s interest in avoiding losses ran contrary to
the corporation’s interest in maintaining her public reputation.
No precedent exists to support this argument just as no prece-
92 Id.  at 977-78.
93 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, Beam ex rel.  Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004) (No. 501, 2003).
94 See  discussion supra  Part III.A.
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dent supported the duty to monitor claim in the Beam  suit.95
The claim that Stewart breached her duty of care suffers be-
cause Stewart’s decision was a private decision not typically cov-
ered by the duty of care.  The duty of care requires directors to
use care and good faith in making business decisions related to
the corporation they direct.  Extending the duty to private deci-
sions would require massive doctrinal changes to the duty of
care.  First, the court would have to expand the predicate deci-
sion to include both business and private decisions.  Then, to
avoid a court’s substituting its judgment for that of private indi-
viduals, the court would have to recognize a private judgment
rule akin to the business judgment rule to protect private, in-
formed decisions made in good faith.96  Instead of drastically
changing the duty of care, a court would likely do as the Beam
court did and dismiss the claim for lack of precedential support.
Finally, framing Stewart’s ImClone sale as waste also falls
outside traditional legal analysis.  Although Stewart’s reputation
was an important asset to her company,97 tarnishing her reputa-
tion by making an allegedly illegal stock sale hardly amounts to a
wasteful expense of corporate assets.  At most, any harm to her
reputation was collateral to the ImClone sale.  Furthermore,
courts only invoke waste in unconscionable situations involving
director compensation, excessively low sales prices for stock or
control, and corporate gifts.98
Even if the Beam  court had reached the merits of the claim
that Stewart breached her state law fiduciary duties, success on
the claim would have been unlikely.  The duties do not extend to
private behavior that is outside the director’s corporate capacity.
State law has not developed to redress the harm to shareholder
value caused by the private criminal behavior of celebrity corpo-
rate figures.  As described in the next part, the shareholders in
the class action suit have similar challenges to recovery under
federal law.
95 Beam , 833 A.2d at 961.
96 See the discussion of the business judgment rule, supra  Part III.A.
97 See supra  note 23.
98 See  discussion supra  Part III.A.
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IV
APPLYING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW TO PROTECT
SHAREHOLDERS FROM CELEBRITY CORPORATE FIGURES’
PRIVATE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
In the appropriate situation, federal securities law may allow
shareholders to recover the decline in shareholder value caused
by some private criminal behavior of celebrity corporate figures.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act outlaws fraud or
manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of a secur-
ity.99  Even if the criminal behavior had no connection to securi-
ties, shareholders still might be able to recover if the celebrity
corporate figure acted to mislead investors regarding the criminal
behavior for the purpose of boosting the share price.
A. Elements of Securities Fraud
Under the authority of section 10(b), the Securities and Ex-
change Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5 that specified cate-
gories of behavior that, in connection with a purchase or sale of
any security, constitute securities fraud.  The behaviors include:
(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b)
[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person . . . .100
Once a plaintiff alleges facts that fit these categories, the plain-
tiff still must show the typical elements of fraud, including scien-
ter,101 materiality,102 causation,103 reliance,104 and damages.105
The plaintiff can only meet Rule 10b-5’s scienter requirement
by “stat[ing] with particularity facts giving rise to a strong infer-
ence that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”106
99 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
100 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
101 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
102 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
103 Id.  at 241.
104 Id.  at 243.
105 See id.
106 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).  Circuit courts have interpreted this pleading
requirement in three ways.  The easiest standard, used in the Second and Third Cir-
cuits, allows the plaintiff to show a strong inference of scienter by alleging evidence
of motive and opportunity to commit fraud or recklessness.  Novak v. Kasaks, 216
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Materiality is present “if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider [the misstatement or
omission] important.”107  Causation is split into transaction cau-
sation and loss causation, with liability attaching only when the
plaintiff can show that the defendant’s conduct caused both the
plaintiff’s transaction and resulting loss.108  Transaction causation
is similar to “but for” causation, describing the conduct that in-
duced the purchase or sale of the securities,109 whereas loss cau-
sation is similar to proximate cause, describing the conduct that
caused the economic harm.110  Finally, the plaintiffs must show
reliance.  To some degree, reliance is analogous to transaction
causation.111  Reliance provides the link between the investor’s
actions and the defendant’s actions.112  Reliance on misstate-
ments and omissions is presumed because the market rapidly in-
corporates any public material misrepresentation into the market
price.113  The standard of proof in a private securities fraud ac-
tion is the civil standard, preponderance of the evidence.114
F.3d 300, 310-11 (2d. Cir. 2000); In re  Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35
(3d. Cir. 1999).  Important factors include that the defendant: “(1) benefitted in a
concrete and personal way from the purported fraud . . . ; (2) engaged in deliberately
illegal behavior . . . ; (3) knew facts or had access to information suggesting that their
public statements were not accurate . . . ; or (4) failed to check information they had
a duty to monitor.” Novak , 216 F.3d at 311 (citations omitted).  The Ninth Circuit
rejects the motive and opportunity position in favor of a stricter standard. In re
Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999).  Instead, the plain-
tiff must show the defendant acted with “deliberate or conscious recklessness.” Id.
Several circuits require recklessness “akin to conscious disregard.” In re Comshare
Inc. Sec. Litig ., 183 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999), takes a middle ground approach
that finds motive and opportunity to be relevant to, but not determinative of, scien-
ter. Id.  at 551; see also  Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d
645 (8th Cir. 2001); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001); Phila-
delphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001); Greebel v. FTP Software,
Inc., 194 F.3d 540 (1st Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th
Cir. 1999).
107 Basic , 485 U.S. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 449 (1976)).




112 Basic , 485 U.S. at 243.
113 Id . at 247 (explaining the fraud-on-the-market theory).
114 United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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B. Applying Securities Fraud to Martha Stewart’s
ImClone Sale
Martha Stewart’s ImClone sale provides a framework to deter-
mine how using federal securities law could protect shareholders
from losses caused by a celebrity corporate figure’s private crimi-
nal behavior.  Stewart’s stock sale, by itself, would not normally
expose her to a securities fraud action from MSO shareholders.
Even if she indeed acted on insider information, she was not
“employing a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” MSO share-
holders as described in Rule 10b-5(a).  Nor was she engaging “in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates” as a fraud
on MSO shareholders as described in Rule 10b-5(c).  ImClone
shareholders might have claims against Stewart under those parts
of the rule, but MSO shareholders would not be interested
parties.
Additionally, Stewart’s false proclamations of innocence to the
public, by themselves, would not normally amount to securities
fraud.  However, Rule 10b-5(b) encompasses misleading state-
ments or omissions connected with the purchase or sale of a se-
curity.  If Stewart’s statements were made with the intent of
protecting or boosting MSO’s share price, those statements might
be converted into securities fraud.  In Stewart’s criminal trial, the
court dismissed this theory of securities fraud because the gov-
ernment failed to present sufficient evidence to show scienter.115
The holding was predicated on the heightened standard of proof
used in a criminal trial when assessing the sufficiency of the evi-
dence.116  The plaintiffs in the civil securities fraud class action
filed against Stewart will test a similar theory under the lower
civil standard of proof.117  They allege that, in the months follow-
ing the public disclosure of the investigation into Stewart, MSO
and Stewart issued several statements proclaiming her innocence
115 Id.  at 376.  Additionally, many commentators dismissed as quite novel the gov-
ernment’s characterization that Stewart committed securities fraud by proclaiming
her innocence because the misstatements were made about Stewart’s personal af-
fairs, not a security or business. See , e.g. , Paul Thomasch & Gail Appleson, Stewart
Wins Key Ruling on Fraud Charge , at http://www.boston.com/ business/articles/2004/
02/15/stewart_wins_key_ruling_on_fraud_charge (Feb. 14, 2004).
116 Stewart , 305 F.Supp 2d at 376.  The criminal court did not analyze any other
elements of securities fraud, so the question of whether the evidence against Stewart
would be enough to impose liability in a civil trial remains open. Id.  at 378 n.5.
117 Consolidated and Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 61, In re  Martha Stew-
art Living Omnimedia, Inc. Sec. Litig. 02-CV-6273 (JES) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 3,
2002).
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in order “to protect the price of MSO stock from declining and to
minimize the harm news of the government’s investigation would
have on Stewart’s reputation and the Company’s business.”118
In addition to the claim that Stewart’s proclamations of inno-
cence amounted to securities fraud, the plaintiffs in the civil class
action also allege several events prior to publication of the AP
report that, if true, likely amount to a more traditional applica-
tion of Rule 10b-5(b)’s provision against misstatements or omis-
sions.  Prior to the AP report, the complaint alleges a Rule 10b-
5(b) material omission when the MSO board failed to disclose
information regarding the government’s investigation into Stew-
art’s ImClone sale.119  Normally, a material omission is not ac-
tionable under Rule 10b-5 unless a duty to disclose arises.
Directors in possession of material nonpublic information have a
duty to disclose the information unless they refrain from trading
in the stock.120  According to the complaint, the directors’ duty to
disclose arose when they became aware of the nonpublic infor-
mation regarding the investigation and its likely negative impact
on MSO, and then proceeded to sell significant amounts of their
personally-held stock.121  Also, during the period between the
start of the investigation and the public disclosure, the complaint
alleges Rule 10b-5(b) material misstatements when Stewart is-
sued a press release accompanying the fourth-quarter and year-
end reports that MSO was a “smoothly run business with no hid-
den surprises .”122  The company’s SEC filings during the period
also failed to mention the investigation despite including the risk
statement that damage to Stewart’s public image would harm the
share price.123
The class-action plaintiffs who bought MSO shares between
the time Stewart learned of the investigation and the time Stew-
art’s claims of innocence were proven false at the conclusion of
the criminal trial would meet Rule 10b-5’s threshold requirement
of alleging fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a se-
curity.  Additionally, the plaintiffs would likely prove scienter for
all the alleged events because they would only have to meet the
118 Id.  ¶ 73.
119 Id.  ¶ 61.
120 See  SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
121 In re  Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Sec. Litig. 02-CV-6273 (JES) ¶
66, 69.
122 Id.  ¶ 79 (alteration in original).
123 Id.  ¶ 79-83.
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Second Circuit’s pleading standard of motive and opportunity or
recklessness by a preponderance of the evidence.124  Stewart and
the board clearly had motive and opportunity.  Stewart owned
over sixty percent of MSO shares, having much of her personal
wealth tied to MSO’s share price.125  MSO’s board members also
owned MSO stock, selling over $5 million dollars worth of stock
during the period prior to the AP report.126  Because Stewart’s
reputation was a significant factor in MSO’s success, she had mo-
tivation to not disclose the investigation and to defend her repu-
tation through the false claims of innocence after the AP report
broke.127  In terms of the factors the Second Circuit deems im-
portant,128 Stewart and the board benefited in a concrete and
personal way by preventing the share price decline and, as al-
leged, knew facts suggesting that her public statements were not
accurate.  Unlike in Stewart’s criminal case,129 the plaintiffs in
the civil suit could likely plead the requisite scienter because of
the lower evidentiary standard in civil cases.  Although the plain-
tiffs could successfully allege fraud in connection with a security
and scienter for all the events described in the complaint, the
analysis of whether the plaintiffs could meet the elements of ma-
teriality, causation, reliance, and damages differs for plaintiffs
who purchased MSO prior to the AP report and those who pur-
chased MSO after the report.
The plaintiffs who purchased MSO prior to the AP report
could likely prove all the fraud elements for the pre-AP-report
misstatements and omissions.  The statements that MSO had no
foreseeable problems were false if, as alleged, the board had dis-
cussed the negative impact the news of the investigation would
have had on the stock.  Additionally, a duty to disclose the omis-
sions arose when the board members failed to abstain from trad-
ing on the information.130  The misstatements and omissions
were material because a reasonable investor would likely have
found the news of the investigation important because of the po-
tential effect on Stewart’s reputation.  The immediate and precip-
itous decline in the share price post-disclosure evidences that
124 See supra  note 106.
125 Indictment, supra  note 1, ¶ 59.
126 See supra  note 121 and accompanying text.
127 See supra  note 23.
128 See supra  note 106.
129 See supra  note 116 and accompanying text.
130 See supra  note 120 and accompanying text.
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investors indeed found the information important.  Furthermore,
MSO had already conceded the materiality of harm to Stewart’s
reputation in its prospectus and later SEC filings.
Additionally, pre-AP-report plaintiffs could establish transac-
tion causation because those who purchased MSO stock prior to
the disclosure of the investigation could argue that they were in-
duced to purchase by the omission of news of the investigation or
the positive misstatements that no hidden surprises lurked for
MSO.  Loss causation could be shown because the eventual dis-
closure of the misstated and omitted information caused the im-
mediate decline in share price.  Reliance would be presumed,
since the market price of MSO reflected all the public knowledge
available at the time any individual purchased MSO shares.131
Even though the plaintiffs that purchased MSO shares prior to
the AP report likely would satisfy all the elements of securities
fraud and, thus, could recover for any damages suffered, pin-
pointing the damages would be a challenge because determining
exactly when the share price decline ceased to be related to the
misstatements and omissions would be difficult.
Conversely, those plaintiffs who purchased MSO after the AP
report likely would fail to prove materiality, causation, reliance,
and damages.  Materiality would be difficult to prove because a
reasonable investor would not have found Stewart’s claims of in-
nocence particularly important.  Instead, declaring innocence is
the expected response to criminal accusations, whether guilty or
not.  The continued decline in the share price after Stewart made
the statements indicates reasonable investors, in fact, did not be-
lieve Stewart’s statements.
As for causation, those who purchased MSO stock after the
AP report based on Stewart’s claims of innocence could argue
transaction causation was met because she induced them to buy
on the belief that the share price was undervalued given her in-
nocence.  However, loss causation would be difficult to establish
because the continual decline in MSO’s share price was a result
of the earlier misstatements, not her claims of innocence.  The
decline would have occurred whether or not she claimed inno-
cence.  Because plaintiffs who bought MSO after the AP report
based on Stewart’s claims of innocence would be unlikely to
prove materiality and loss causation, the questions of reliance
and damages are moot.
131 See supra  note 113.
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Under federal law, at least some MSO shareholders could re-
cover for the damage caused by Stewart’s private behavior.
However, using federal securities law to protect shareholders
from celebrity corporate figures whose private criminal behavior
harms shareholder value would only work in very limited factual
circumstances and for a limited class of shareholders.  Like state
law fiduciary duties, the law in this area does not clearly cover a
situation where the celebrity corporate figure harms shareholder
value through private criminal behavior.  To fill this gap, courts
should recognize a new fiduciary duty as outlined in the next
part.
V
THE MARTHA DUTY: A CORPORATE CELEBRITY
FIGURE’S FIDUCIARY DUTY TO AVOID CRIMINAL PRIVATE
BEHAVIOR THAT HARMS SHAREHOLDER VALUE
Shareholders of a company with a corporate celebrity figure
face additional risk not present in a company without such
figures.  Courts should impose a special duty on celebrity corpo-
rate figures to address the additional risk.  Creating a new fiduci-
ary duty to address special, uncommon situations would not be
unprecedented.  For example, the Unocal duty addresses direc-
tors’ defensive conduct in the special situation of a takeover by
subjecting the directors’ decisions to a stricter substantive review
by courts prior to applying the business judgment rule.132  In a
situation in which there is a change of corporate control, direc-
tors must follow the Revlon  duty to earn the highest price for
shareholders.133  The duty of a celebrity corporate figure to avoid
private criminal behavior could be called the “Martha Duty.”
A. Elements of the Martha Duty
A plaintiff asserting the Martha Duty would have to prove that
the defendant: (1) was a celebrity corporate figure; (2) commit-
ted a criminal act, and; (3) caused damages to the corporation.
Initially, the plaintiff would need to prove facts that suggest that
the corporation is so inextricably intertwined with the public im-
age of the defendant that the defendant qualifies as a celebrity
corporate figure.  Relevant facts could include admissions by the
132 See  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
133 See  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
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company to investors that the reputation of the celebrity is a risk
factor of the investment.  Additionally, the market’s reaction to
news of the celebrity corporate figure’s private criminal behavior
would indicate that the market views the corporation and celeb-
rity as inextricably bound.  Finally, when the celebrity corporate
figure is the namesake of the corporation, a rebuttable presump-
tion could exist that the company is inextricably linked to the
celebrity’s image.
Next, the plaintiff would need to prove that the celebrity cor-
porate figure committed a criminal act.134  As discussed in Part
II, this Comment’s concern is private criminal behavior that
harms shareholder value.  Clearly, the plaintiff could meet this
burden by pointing to a conviction or plea.  Absent a conviction
or plea, the plaintiff would have to allege facts that could prove
the criminal behavior by a preponderance of the evidence.
Finally, the plaintiff would have to prove damages.  Event
study methodology could be used to determine any decline in
shareholder value related to the celebrity corporate figure’s crim-
inal behavior.  Essentially, event study methodology starts with
an efficient market hypothesis that a security’s price reflects the
present value of the future cash flow from a company’s assets
given all available information about the company.  New infor-
mation leads to changes in the security price.  A change in the
price after an event reflects the market’s unbiased value of that
event.135  This unbiased value would equal the damages share-
holders suffered.
B. Applying the Martha Duty to Martha Stewart’s
ImClone Sale
The plaintiffs could prove that Martha Stewart was inextrica-
bly intertwined with MSO.  From the release of the prospectus
forward to the most recent 10-Q, MSO has consistently pointed
to Stewart’s public image as a risk factor for investors.  Addition-
134 I intentionally fail to distinguish between the different degrees of crimes, such
as misdemeanors or felonies, that would trigger the Martha Duty.  Instead, the duty
should trigger upon the commission of any crime with the market determining what
weight, if any, to put on a particular crime.
135 Event study methodology has been used to determine the economic effects of
the change of a company’s name, the release of a new product, use of celebrity
spokespersons, product recalls, and adverse regulations or rulings. See, e.g. , Jagdish
Agrawal & Wagner A. Kamakura, The Economic Worth of Celebrity Endorsers: An
Event Study Analysis , 59 JOURNAL OF MARKETING 56 (July 1995).
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ally, the market reaction to the initial disclosure of the investiga-
tion,136 as well as the reaction to the dismissal of the securities-
fraud claim in Stewart’s criminal trial,137 indicates that the mar-
ket viewed Stewart and MSO as inextricably bound.  Finally,
Martha Stewart is the namesake of MSO, allowing plaintiffs to
argue for the presumption that the company is inextricably inter-
twined with her.  Stewart would not likely defeat this element,
but could attempt to do so by showing that MSO has transcended
her reputation by building a successful business model that went
beyond her talent, imagination, and reputation.138
The plaintiffs could also prove the private criminal behavior,
pointing to the conviction in her criminal case.  Had she pre-
vailed in her criminal case, the plaintiffs could still attempt to
prove the very same issues using the lower burden of proof in
civil trials.
Finally, the plaintiffs likely would prove damages.  The precipi-
tous decline in stock price immediately following the public dis-
closure of the ImClone investigation, coupled with the absence of
other MSO news to explain the decline, allows an inference that
the market decline was based solely on the damage to her public
image.  The more interesting question would be determining
when the event ceased.  Plaintiffs would argue that it ceased on
the date the stock price hit the lowest mark, thereby allowing for
the most damages.  Stewart would argue for a much shorter time-
line, minimizing her liability.
A court would likely find that Stewart violated the Martha
Duty.  Given that the criminal jury found the alleged facts sur-
rounding her ImClone sale to be true,139 this is the correct result.
Stewart built a personal fortune by enticing investment in a cor-
poration that leveraged her personal reputation.  Although in-
vestors could assess the likelihood Stewart would fall out of
public favor, they could not assess, and therefore should not be
forced to assume, the risk of her criminal behavior.  Existing fi-
136 See supra  note 9.
137 MSO shares surged 11% the day charges were dismissed.  Jonathan D. Glater,
Most Serious Charge Against Stewart is Dismissed , N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at A1.
138 Compare MSO with other companies such as Dell Computers.  While MSO is
still trying to evolve the Stewart brand beyond the Stewart personality, Dell Com-
puters has a proven business model and capable management team that transcends
founder Michael Dell.  Alan Brew, MSO Must Find Life After Stewart for Company
to Survive , PR WEEK (U.S.), March 1, 2004, at 8.
139 See supra  note 6 and accompanying text.
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duciary duties make clear that investors are not expected to as-
sess the risk that directors lack good faith or act in a self-
interested manner.  Similarly, shareholders valuing MSO stock
should not be expected to factor in the likelihood that Stewart
would commit private criminal acts that would harm shareholder
value.  The proposed Martha Duty allocates the responsibility to
the person most responsible for the damages, Martha Stewart.
CONCLUSION
Investing in a company whose public image is inextricably in-
tertwined with that of a celebrity corporate figure includes an
investment risk that the private behavior of the celebrity will
harm shareholder value.  While individual investors are often
best suited to assess risk and price investments accordingly, cor-
porate law should not require investors to assume the risk that
these celebrity corporate figures will commit private criminal acts
to the detriment of shareholder value.  Traditional state law fidu-
ciary duties do not adequately allow shareholders to recover
from a celebrity corporate figure whose private criminal behavior
has reduced shareholder value.  Similarly, federal securities law
is not well-suited to remedy these losses.  Therefore, courts
should recognize a special fiduciary duty under which celebrity
corporate figures owe a duty to avoid criminal behavior in their
private lives that could lead to a decline in shareholder value.
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